The U.S. Coast Guard cited safety failures by Transocean Ltd. (RIG), the owner and operator of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, in an explosion last year that resulted in the worst offshore oil spill in U.S. history.
Poor maintenance of electrical equipment, the bypassing of gas alarms and automatic shutdown systems and a lack of training played a role in the April 20, 2010, catastrophe, which killed 11 people, injured 16 and left crude pouring into the Gulf for 87 days, the Coast Guard said in a 288-page report released today.
“We strongly disagree with, and documentary evidence in the Coast Guard’s possession refutes, key findings in this report,” Lou Colasuonno, a Transocean spokesman in New York, said in an e-mail.
“The Coast Guard inspected the Deepwater Horizon just seven months before the Macondo incident and certified the rig as being fully compliant with all applicable U.S. and international marine safety compliance standards, including those associated with fire and gas detection systems,” Colasuonno said. “Further, at the time of the accident the Deepwater Horizon possessed all required valid documents verifying compliance with all international and Coast Guard requirements. The company looks forward to setting the record straight.”
The Coast Guard said in the report that the “deficiencies indicate that Transocean’s failure to have an effective safety management system and instill a culture that emphasizes and ensures safety contributed to this disaster.”
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Like most people likely did, I read the USCG ROI and became very unhappy with Transocean. It appeared a slipshod and feckless organization had cut too many corners for too long and finally got people killed.
It was not until I read Transocean's response that it occurred to me the Coast Guard Report might not be up to the lofty standards of integrity that have distinguished centuries of investigations into maritime disasters.
Upon further reflection, the judgement that something is seriously wrong with this Coast Guard investigation appears solid. There is hardly a single point in the USCG ROI that is based on facts in evidence, and a great many that are self contradictory, and what is left is generally entirely contradicted by facts in evidence.
I have read every word of testimony, examined every exhibit, read the President's Commission report, BP's report, Transocean's, I have followed the math and researched the fine points of technical aspects of well engineering and drilling, and there is much to learn about how to avoid disaster in the future.
Unless, that is, you rely upon the USCG ROI, this document is an insult to the proud tradition of Coast Guard investigations, a gross injustice to the dead, injured and to the broader community working in the Gulf, and sterile of value in assessing the root causes of this tragedy.